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In this paper, we vindicate the relevance of the notion of success or satisfaction for the 
normative assessment of voting rules. We provide arguments in support of this view and 
emphasize the conceptual and analytical differences between this notion and that of 
decisiveness. The conclusions are illustrated in the case study provided by three different 










When a set of individuals makes decisions by means of a voting rule that speciﬁes for which
conﬁgurations of votes a proposal is accepted, the question of the ”power” or ”voting
power” that the voting rule confers to each voter arises. This issue is at the basis of
a considerable piece of literature, both theoretical and applied. In particular a variety
of ”power indices” intended to assess diﬀerent variations of the notion of ”power” under
diﬀerent conditions have been proposed1.
Since Shapley-Shubik’s (1954) interpretation of their index2 as the probability of be-
ing ”pivotal” or decisive in the make of a decision, the notion of decisiveness has de
facto been widely accepted by many scholars as the right formalization of the notion of
”voting power”. Banzhaf (1965) and Coleman (1971, 1986), in spite of their right criti-
cism of Shapley-Shubik’s index, also assume the notion of decisiveness at the basis of their
indices3. These indices, as well as others, have been often applied with normative purposes
to diﬀerent situations from the real world, and have been the basis of diﬀerent norma-
tive recommendations about the ”right” voting rule in a variety of actual committees of
representatives.
In spite of this dominant view, some authors have raised doubts as to the relevance
of this interpretation of ”power” as decisiveness, especially for normative purposes, sug-
gesting as more relevant to this eﬀect the notion of ”satisfaction” or ”success”. That is,
focussing on the likelihood of having the result one voted for irrespective of whether one’s
vote was crucial for it or not. Rae (1969) is the ﬁrst to propose a measure of success
for symmetric voting rules, and Dubey and Shapley (1979) extend this ”Rae index” to
arbitrary voting rules. Later, a few authors have paid attention to the notion of success,
as Brams and Lake (1978), Barry (1980) (from whom we take the term of ”success” that
we use here), Straﬃn, Davis, and Brams (1981), and more recently K¨ onig and Br¨ auninger
(1998)4.
Nevertheless, as Benoˆ it and Kornhauser (2002) remark, ”although a voter’s satisfac-
tion is arguably more important than a voter’s power, the former concept has received
comparatively little attention from game theorists.” Moreover, it must be said that the
1See, e.g., Felsenthal and Machover’s (1998) monography, or a recent synthesis in Laruelle and Valen-
ciano (2004a).
2Their index is the result of applying the Shapley (1953) value to the simple game that results from
the voting rule by assigning ’worth’ 1 to the ’winning coalitions’ and 0 to the losing ones.
3This is also the case with Penrose’s (1946) pioneer measure.
4In a recent paper Barber` a and Jackson (2004), in a diﬀerent framework, address the issue of the
”eﬃcient” voting rule, for which, under certain assumptions, the aggregated expected utility of the voters
is maximized.two concepts have been often confused or at least insuﬃciently separated. Possibly, this is
partly due to the relationship pointed out by Dubey and Shapley (1979). They showed that
there exists an aﬃne-linear relation between the ”Rae index” and the Banzhaf index5.T h i s
no doubt has contributed to overlooking the question of success in the literature, where
success is often either ignored or considered a sort of appendix or secondary ingredient of
decisiveness, commonly considered as the substantial notion.
The purpose of this paper is to vindicate the relevance of the notion of success or
satisfaction for the assessment of voting rules with normative purposes, and emphasize the
conceptual diﬀerence between this notion and that of decisiveness. To this end we examine
some analytical relations and their generality, and some diﬀerences of consequence in
practical quantiﬁcations within the setting introduced in Laruelle and Valenciano (2004a).
The conclusions are illustrated in a case study: the three voting rules that have been
recently considered for EU’s Council of Ministers6: Nice’s voting rule, the one proposed by
the Convention and the one ﬁnally adopted at the European Council of June 2004. This
application is a small step towards ﬁlling a gap that seems to exist in the literature, where
most studies apply indices of decisiveness and hardly pay any attention to the question
of success. We show that the conclusions of a comparison between these three voting
rules based on the point of view of success may diﬀer from the conclusions based on the
decisiveness point of view. We pay a special attention to what seems to be an important
concern of the Member States: the probability of being imposed a proposal to which they
oppose.
2 Success versus decisiveness: analytical discussion
2.1 Background and notation
We consider voting rules to make dichotomous choices (acceptance and rejection) by a
voting body. Let N = {1,2,..,n} denote the set of seats. If any vote diﬀerent from ’yes’
is assimilated into ’no’, there are 2n possible vote conﬁgurations. Each vote conﬁguration
can be represented by the set S ⊆ N of ’yes’ voters. The cardinal of S will be denoted by
s.A n N-voting rule is fully speciﬁed by the set W of winning vote conﬁgurations,t h a t
is, those which lead to the acceptance of a proposal. We assume the set W satisﬁes the
following conditions: (i): The unanimous ’yes’ leads to the acceptance of the proposal:
5More precisely, they show this to be so for the ”raw” (i.e., Banzhaf index as deﬁned originally) and a
natural extension of Rae measure of success for arbitray voting rules.
6Many studies have been devoted to the European Union Council of Ministers and in particular to
t h eN i c er u l e( s e e ,f o ri n s t a n c e ,L a r u e l l ea n dW i d g r ´ en (1998), Felsenthal and Machover (2001), Lane and
Maeland (2002), Leech (2002), Laruelle, Mart´ inez and Valenciano (2004)).
4N ∈ W; (ii): The unanimous ’no’ leads to the rejection of the proposal: ∅ / ∈ W; (iii): If a
vote conﬁguration is winning, then any other conﬁguration containing it is also winning:
If S ∈ W,t h e nT ∈ W for any T containing S; (iv): If one vote conﬁguration leads to the
acceptance of a proposal, the opposite conﬁguration will not: If S ∈ W then N\S/ ∈ W.
We assume that a set of (N-labelled) voters uses a voting rule W as a ’take-it-or-leave-
it’ committee. That is, a committee that can only accept or reject proposals submitted
to it by some external agency7. As in Laruelle and Valenciano (2004a) we assume that a
second input describes the voting situation: a probability distribution over the set of all
p o s s i b l ev o t ec o n ﬁgurations. The most natural choice for normative purposes seems to be
assuming all vote conﬁgurations being equally probable. Nevertheless, we introduce the
basic notions in terms of an arbitrary probability distribution, which can be interpreted
as a ”common prior” about the voters voting behavior. As we will see this provides a
wider perspective that allows for a better understanding of the concepts involved and
their relationships.
Let p denote a probability distribution over the set of vote conﬁgurations, and let p(S)
denote, for each S ⊆ N, the probability of S being the vote conﬁguration. For a given
p and a given W, several features can be evaluated ex ante. First, the ease or diﬃculty
to pass proposals, can be evaluated by the probability of a proposal being accepted or
rejected, given by




and ¯ α(W, p): = Prob (the proposal is rejected) = 1 − α(W, p).
A voter’s probability of being decisive (i.e., having the result one voted for and being
crucial for it) is given by









while the likelihood of being successful (having the result one voted for) for a voter i is
given by







In spite of the obvious diﬀerence of meaning between the notions of success and that
of decisiveness, in view of the dominant confusion alluded to in the introduction it seems
7This limitation implicit in the traditional approach to the assessment of voting situations based on the
sole voting rule is systematically minimized (if not completely ignored) in the power index literature. The
case of a ’bargaining commitee’ with the capacity to negotiate the outcome under a voting rule requires a
diﬀerent treatment, and is addressed in Laruelle and Valenciano (2004b).
5convenient providing additional arguments for a clear distinction. To this end we examine
in the next subsections some relationships and their very particular character, as well as
some relevant diﬀerences.
We will deal also with the following ’interim’ evaluations (i.e., conditional expectations8
updated with the private information of each voter’s own vote) for which we use the
following notation:
Φi+
i (W,p):= Prob (i is decisive | i votes ’yes’),
Φi−
i (W,p):= Prob (i is decisive | i votes ’no’),
Ωi+
i (W,p):= Prob (i is successful | i votes ’yes’),
Ωi−
i (W,p):= Prob (i is successful | i votes ’no’).
We will also denote




2.2 Some especial relationships
As commented in the introduction, the notion of decisiveness has been widely accepted as
the right formalization of the notion of ”voting power” or ”voting inﬂuence”. Whatever
the relevance of this interpretation of power, it can be argued that it seems more relevant
from the voters’ point of view the likelihood of having the result they voted for irrespective
of their being crucial for it or not.
Despite of the clear conceptual diﬀerence, the notions of success and decisiveness are
still largely conﬂated and seen as the two faces of a same coin. The confusion arises from
certain particular relations that hold exclusively for the special distribution of probability
that assigns the same probability to all vote conﬁgurations. Namely,
p∗(S): =
1
2n for all conﬁguration S ⊆ N.
This distribution of probability is the underlying assumption of diﬀerent power indices pro-
posed in the literature (see Laruelle and Valenciano, 2004a). This is the case of the Banzhaf
(1965) index (Bzi(W)), the Rae (1969) index (Raei(W)), Coleman’s (1971) indices to pre-
vent action (ColP
i (W)) and to initiate action (ColI
i(W)), and K¨ onig-Brauninger’s (1998)
inclusiveness index (KBi(W)), respectively given by:
Bzi(W)=Probp∗(i is decisive) = Φi(W, p∗)
8The conditional probability Prob(A | B)=
Prob(A∩B)
Prob(B) only makes sense if Prob(B) =0 .
6Raei(W)=Probp∗(i is successful) = Ωi(W,p∗)
ColP
i (W)=Probp∗(i is decisive | the proposal is accepted)
ColI
i(W)=Probp∗(i is decisive | the proposal is rejected)
KBi(W)=Probp∗(i is successful | the proposal is accepted).
Dubey and Shapley (1979) established the well-known relation between the Banzhaf
index and their extension of Rae’ index9
2Raei(W)=1+Bzi(W),
which10 in the current notation can be restated like this
2Ωi(W, p∗)=1+Φi(W,p∗). (5)
It is also well-known that the Banzhaf index can also be expressed as the probability
of being decisive conditional to voter i voting ’yes’ or voting ’no’:
Bzi(W)=Probp∗(i is decisive | i votes ’yes’)




i (W, p∗). (6)
Relation (5), though it does not justify the confusion, has no doubt contributed to
overlooking the notion of success or satisfaction, often considered as just a sort of appendix
or secondary ingredient of decisiveness because of it. According to Dubey and Shapley
(1979, p. 124): ”It was not noticed for several years that this ’Rae index’ is nothing but
the Banzhaf index in disguise.” More recently, Hosli and Machover (2004) commenting
about the ”likelihood of a member’s vote being critical and the likelihood of that member
being successful in securing desired outcomes”, claim that ”as a matter of fact these two
concepts of voting power, far from being opposed to each other, are virtually identical, and
diﬀer only in using a diﬀerent scale of measurement.” But as we argue in 2.3, equation
(5), though correct, has been considerably misleading.
9Note that we have divided Dubey and Shapley’s equation (53) by 2
n.
10Much more recently, Lane and Maeland (2000) also show a similar relation between K¨ onig and




This is equation (28) in Lane and Maeland (2000), though they did not seem to be aware that what they
deﬁne as the individual probability of blocking is Coleman’s index to prevent action.
7On the other hand, relation (6) conveys the idea that there is no diﬀerence between
the ”approval power” and the ”blocking power”. As Straﬃn (1982 p. 267-268) puts it:
”(..) we mentioned ’blocking coalitions’ which could prevent a proposal from passing, even
though they might not be able themselves to pass a proposal. This would suggest that
in addition to studying ’approval power’ as we have here, we should also study ’blocking
power’.” But he concludes that the Banzhaf (or Shapley-Shubik’s) index can serve to
”eﬀectively measure both kinds of power.”11 Again in this respect, as will be discussed in
2.3, equation (6) has also been a source of misunderstanding. Moreover, along with (5),
relation (6) may induce a somewhat unconscious but deﬁnitely wrong conclusion: that a
relation similar to (6) holds for success. But as we will presently see this is false.
2.3 Some relevant diﬀerences
In order to achieve a deeper understanding of the meaning of the relations mentioned
in 2.2, we examine the possibility of generalizing them within the setting given in 2.1.
As we will see, these mathematical relations do not hold in general, but arise only due
to the extreme symmetry of the particular probability distribution p∗. This provides
additional arguments in support of a clear diﬀerentiation between the notions of success
and decisiveness.
To this purpose it will be of use the only relation that, apart from the evident
Φi(W,p) ≤ Ωi(W,p), is really a genuine and general relationship between these two notions.
This is Barry’s (1980) equation: ’Success’ = ’Decisiveness’ + ’Luck,’ which remains valid
in a much more precise and general version. Namely, for any rule W and any arbitrary p,
we have
Ωi(W,p)=Φi(W, p)+Λi(W, p), (7)
where Λi(W, p) denotes Barry’s ”luck” (though perhaps a more suitable term should be
”irrelevance”, or strictly speaking ”success without decisiveness”), given by
Λi(W,p): =Prob (i is successful and not decisive).
If there existed a linear relation extending (5), success and decisiveness would just be
two faces of a same coin. But in general,
2Ωi(W, p)  =1+Φi(W,p).
Moreover relation (5) is exceptional in the following sense: it holds only when all vote







∗), Coleman’s ”power to initiate action” and ”power to prevent action”,
though based on the notion of decisiveness, diﬀer. For this reason Coleman’s indices have been sometimes
used to distinguish what is indistinguishable from the interim a priori decisiveness point of view.
8Proposition 1 Relation 2Ωi(W, p)=1+Φi(W,p) holds for every W if and only if p = p∗.





















































= Φi(W,p∗)+α(W,p∗) − Ωi(W, p∗)+1− α(W,p∗),
which yields (5).
Necessity: Assume 2Ωi(W, p)=1+Φi(W,p)h o l d sf o re v e r yW.W e w i l l p r o v e t h a t
for any T of any size t (1 ≤ t ≤ n)i th o l d sp(T)=p(T \ i). We will proceed by inverse




p(S)a n dΦi(W,p)=p(N)+p(N \ i).




p(S)=1+p(N)+p(N \ i). (8)




p(S) − p(N \ i)a n dΦi(W,p)=0 ,




p(S)=1+2 p(N \ i). (9)
12The suﬃciency of this condition is well known, but we prove it in order to see explicitly what role
plays the assumption p = p
∗.







Thus the claim is proved for t = n. Now assume that p(S)=p for any S of size s ≥ t,f o r
some t (t ≥ 1). We show that for any T of size t it holds p(T \i)=p. Fix any such T and












































Therefore p = p(T \ i). Thus the claim is proved and consequently p(S)= 1
2n, for all
S ⊆ N.
A similar result holds for the following special relationship between the interim variants
of success and decisiveness13. But note that in this case, the relation is not linear aﬃne
any more, but the probability to pass a proposal enters the relation.
Proposition 2 The following relations
Ωi+












hold for every W if and only if p = p∗.



















13The same can be said about the relation between K¨ onig-Brauninger index and the Coleman’ power to










































The other equality is obtained similarly.
Necessity: Assume that for a given p both relations hold for any rule W. Then,
taking into account that both Ωi(W,p)a n dΦi(W,p), are the averages of their respective
interim variants, by multiplying both equations by 1/2 and adding them up, equation
2Ωi(W, p)=1+Φi(W,p) is obtained. But, in view of Proposition 1, this implies p = p∗.
In sum: relation (5) between Rae’s and Banzhaf’s indices do not extend to their natural
extensions for arbitrary priors diﬀerent from p∗. In other terms, it has more to do with the
very especial character of this probability distribution than with any general relationship
between these two notions.
Now we turn our attention to relation (6), that provides three alternative interpreta-
tions of the Banzhaf index, either as the unconditional probability of being decisive or as
the interim evaluations (conditional to a voter voting ’no’ or voting ’yes’, respectively)
of this probability. A ﬁrst natural question that arises is whether relation (6) can be
generalized to any p. The answer is negative, as in general,
Φi(W, p)  = Φi+
i (W,p)  = Φi−
i (W,p).
In fact, as proved in Laruelle and Valenciano (2004a), relation (6) holds only if every voter
votes ’yes’ or ’no’ with a certain probability independently from the others14.
In view of (5) the question of whether a similar relation to (6) holds for success, at
least for p∗ or some other special distribution arises. The answer again is negative. In
general,
Ωi(W,p∗)  = Ωi+
i (W,p∗)  = Ωi−
i (W, p∗).
14Therefore, in particular the relation does not hold for the p for which Φ(W, p) becomes the Shapley-
Shubik index. Or the other way round, the Shapley-Shubik index can be interpreted also as interim eval-
uation of the probability of being decisive (either as Φ
i+
i (W, p)o rΦ
i−
i (W, p)), but for diﬀerent probability
distributions.
11A voter’s probability of getting a proposal accepted when the voter favors the proposal may
diﬀer from the probability of getting the proposal rejected when the voter votes against
it, even under the assumption that all voting conﬁgurations are equiprobable.




2n−1,w h i l eΩi−
i (W,p∗)=1 .
This perfectly reﬂects the intuition that under the majority rule, the likelihood of
getting a proposal accepted when a given voter favors the proposal will be quite small (the
larger the number of seats, the smaller the probability), while the proposal will surely be
rejected whenever a voter votes against it, no matter the number of seats (any voter has
av e t or i g h t ) .
More generally, the three evaluations of success coincide only for the trivial case in
which all voters vote always unanimously, as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 3 The relation Ωi(W,p)=Ωi+
i (W, p)=Ωi−
i (W,p) holds for any voting rule
if and only if all voters vote always unanimously. That is, with a certain probability γ
(0 < γ < 1) all voters vote ’yes’, and with probability 1 − γ all vote ’no’.
Proof. First note that the two conditional probabilities make sense only if the case
where any voter i votes ’yes’ (or ’no’) with probability zero is excluded. Thus, we assume
0 < γi(p) < 1, for all i. Assume that Ωi(W,p)=Ωi+
i (W, p)h o l d sf o re v e r yW.L e t









This yields that necessarily p(N)=γi(p)o rγi(p)=1B u ta sγi(p) < 1, it must be
p(N)=γ, and p(∅)=1 −γ,f o rs o m eγ (0 < γ < 1). On the other hand, it is straightforward
that for this trivial voting behavior the equality of the three evaluations holds.
This is a relevant diﬀerence between success and decisiveness, as it is often the case
that voters (or the analyst) are diﬀerently concerned with the prospect of getting the
result they want depending on which is the sense of the decision: acceptance or rejection.
Especially when rejection means keeping the status quo there may exist a bias in either
sense, giving priority to one or another form of success. Thus the assessments based on
either interim measures of success may diﬀer not only at the quantitative level. They may
rank diﬀerently voting rules, which may be relevant for the comparison of voting rules, as
will be illustrated in the EU case study in section 3. This nuance is completely lost by
Banzhaf’s decisiveness index.
123 Case study: Three voting rules for the EU Council
A relevant case study that has been once and again approached from the power indices
point of view is the European Council of Ministers. Most decisiveness indices have been
applied (see, for instance, Hosli (1993), Widgr´ en (1994), or Br¨ uckner and Peters (1996)),
but to the best of our knowledge the only application of an index of success is by K¨ onig
and Br¨ auninger (1998). Practitioners have often raised objections about the power indices
approach. Part of this criticism is right (e.g., some applications of some power indices lack
any clear sense), other times is based on a misinterpretation of the meaning of this ap-
proach, and concerns the assumption that all vote conﬁgurations have the same probability
(p = p∗)15, which is a natural assumption from a normative point of view when the goal
is to assess the voting rule itself. But practitioners have also pointed out a more serious
criticism that, it has to be admitted, has been usually ignored by scholars in spite of its
serious motives: why to pay so much attention to decisiveness, where success seems a more
important issue for the involved voters? As Moberg, in a comment on the Banzhaf index
and the Intergovernmental Conference of Nice, puts it: ”(...) it is very doubtful that this
concept of power is relevant in EU politics. There is hardly any indication that Member
States were actually seeking power in that sense in IGC 2000. Instead they were trying to
make sure that they could safeguard their essential national interests, together with other
like-minded countries, whether they had a pivotal position or not.” (Moberg, 2002, p.
261). He also distinguishes between ”blocking power” (”it means a country contribution
to a blocking minority”) and ”partner in qualiﬁed majorities”. Also, in a recent paper,
Hosli and Machover (2004) recognize that too little attention has been paid to blocking
power in its own right.
This line of thought seems to suggest that attention should shift from decisiveness to
other issues involved in a voting situation. Namely, the probability of a proposal being
accepted (α), the probability of a proposal being accepted given that voter i votes in its
favor (Ωi+
i ), and the probability of a proposal being rejected given that voter i votes against
it (Ωi−
i ). Member States that are worried for their sovereignty will surely be interested in
minimizing the probability of being imposed a proposal that they reject, that is to say,
1 − Ωi−
i , or equivalently, to maximizing Ωi−
i . More pro-integration members may value
more the probability of a proposal being accepted α, and in particular having the proposal
accepted once they vote in its favor, that is, maximizing Ωi+
i may also matter.
Here we compare three rules that have been proposed for the enlarged Council of 25
15For instance, Moberg (2002, p. 261): ”the vast majority of the millions of theoretically conceivable
coalitions are highly unlikely.”
13Member States, which are, along with their populations16 (popi, in thousands): Germany
(82165), United Kingdom (59623), France (58747), Italy (57680), Spain (39442), Poland
(38654), Netherlands (15864), Greece (10546), Czech Republic (10278), Belgium (10239),
Hungary (10043), Portugal (9998), Sweden (8861), Austria(8092), Slovakia (5399), Den-
mark (5330), Finland (5171), Ireland (3775), Lithuania (3699), Latvia (2424), Slovenia
(1988), Estonia (1439), Cyprus (755), Luxemburg (436), and Malta (380).
The ﬁrst rule that we consider is the Nice rule (WNi), a rule based on the re-weighting
proposed in the Intergovernmental Conference that concluded in Nice, December 2000.
The second rule (the Convention rule (WCv)) was suggested by the Convention set up
after the summit of Laeken in 2001. The third rule (the Constitution rule (WCs)) is the
rule that was ﬁnally adopted in the recent European Council in Brussels.
The ﬁrst two voting rules require the support of two majorities in order to pass a
decision. In both cases the ﬁrst majority is a simple majority of Member States. The
second is a weighted majority. In the Nice rule, the weights are not proportional to the
populations as it is the case with the Convention rule. Formally, the three rules are
respectively:
1 .T h eN i c er u l e : 17
WNi =
+
S ⊆ N :
[
i∈S
wi ≥ 232 and s ≥ 13
,
,
where the vector of weight is:
w =( 2 9 ,29,29,29,27,27,13,12,12,12,12,12,10,10,7,7,7,7,7,4,4,4,4,4,3).
2. The Convention rule:
WCv =
+






popi and s ≥ 13
,
.
3. The Constitution rule:
WCs =
+







popi and s ≥ 15
&
or s ≥ 22
,
.
16Source EUROSTAT (2000), quoted from Galloway (2001).
17Here we ignore the ”population safety net” that stipulates: ”When a decision is to be adopted by the
Council by a qualiﬁed majority, a member of the Council may request veriﬁcation that the Member States
constituting the qualiﬁed majority represent at least 62% of the total population of the Union. If that
condition is shown not to have been met, the decision in question shall not be adopted.” In fact the results
that we obtain with or without this clause diﬀer very little.
14For normative purposes, deliberately ignoring any information beyond the rule itself,
the natural choice of p to compare the three rules is p∗. This particular distribution of
probability will allow us to make quantitative comparisons.
First, let us consider the ease (respectively, diﬃculty) of accepting proposal. Com-
puting the probability of a proposal being accepted (respectively, rejected). That is,
computing α(W,p∗) (respectively, ¯ α(W, p∗): =1−α(W,p∗)) for the three rules, we obtain:
α(WCv,p ∗)=0 .225, ¯ α(WCv,p ∗)=0 .775,
α(WCs,p ∗)=0 .101, ¯ α(WCs,p ∗)=0 .899,
α(WNi,p ∗)=0 .036, ¯ α(WNi,p ∗)=0 .964.
It means that with the rule proposed in Nice it would be a priori extremely diﬃcult to pass
proposals. The rule proposed by the Convention substantially increases the probability
of passing a proposal (or reduces the probability of a proposal being rejected). The
probability of a proposal being rejected under the Constitution rule is larger than under
the Convention rule but smaller than under the Nice rule. The probabilities of success
for every country, unconditional and interim in both senses, are given in Table 1. The
following comments can be made on this table. Starting with the Nice rule, a ﬁrst comment
concerns the probability of a proposal being rejected given that a certain country votes
against it (Ωi−
i ): this probability is strikingly high for France, Germany, Italy, Poland,
Spain and UK (more than 0.99). It means that the rule gives a great veto power to these
big states. Even small states have a very high probability of having a proposal rejected
if they vote against it (nearly 0.97 for the smallest state, Malta). The rule proposed by
the Convention reduces this probability for all states (the range of probabilities is between
0.93 -for Germany- and 0.79 -for Malta). The probabilities that are obtained with the
Constitution rule are intermediate between the two above mentioned rules. We have that
for any state i:
Ωi−
i (WCv,p ∗) < Ωi−
i (WCs,p ∗) < Ωi−
i (WNi,p ∗).
The counterpart is that with the Nice rule, the probability of a proposal being accepted
g i v e nt h a tas t a t ev o t e sf o ri t( Ωi+
i ) is very small for all states (for the largest state,
Germany, this probability is 0.06). The probability of having a proposal accepted given
that a state votes for it increases substantially (for instance, for Germany this probability
passes from 0.06 to 0.26). The probabilities that are obtained with the Constitution rule
are again intermediate between the two above mentioned rules. We have for any state i:
Ωi+
i (WCv,p ∗) > Ωi+
i (WCs,p ∗) > Ωi+
i (WNi,p ∗).
The probability of getting the outcome (acceptance or rejection) one votes for with the
Nice rule is around 0.50 (between 0.55 for Germany and 0.50 for Malta). This probability
15is larger for the Constitution rule than with the Nice rule, and the largest under the
Convention rule. That is, for any state i:
Ωi(WCv,p ∗) > Ωi(WCs,p ∗) > Ωi(WNi,p ∗).
In sum, the results are the following. Among the three rules, the Convention rule is the
one that confers all the states the largest probability of getting the outcome one votes for.
The Convention rule is also the rule that yields the largest probability of a proposal being
accepted. This is however done at the expense of being more often imposed proposals
one does not favor. In other terms, if the criterion that prevails is ”keeping national
sovereignty” and not being imposed a proposal one does not want, then the best rule
of the three is the Nice rule. In any case, contrary to what is sometimes claimed, the
choice of the rule is not a zero-sum game between large and small states. It is more a
problem of the choice of the criterion. Those who are more in favor of further integration
will surely prefer the Convention rule (for its larger probability of passing proposals in
the diﬀerent senses considered), while those who are mainly worried about keeping the
national sovereignty will prefer the Nice rule.
Finally, let us brieﬂy compare these results with the ones obtained from the point of
view of a priori decisiveness, as evaluated by the Banzhaf index18. First, as implied by
(5), the ranking between the rules is the same as the one obtained for the probability of
success. So for any state i we have:
Φi(WCv,p ∗) > Φi(WCs,p ∗) > Φi(WNi,p ∗).
That is, the probability of being decisive would be the largest under the Convention rule,
and the smallest under the Nice rule. But note that for any voting rule, as pointed out
in section 2, we have equality (6) for any state. In other words the assessment based
on decisiveness is insensitive to the diﬀerences between the interim evaluations which are
conspicuous from the point of view of success and no doubt matter for all State Members.
4 Conclusion
A ﬁrst conclusion is the clear conceptual and analytical distinction between the notions
of success and that of decisiveness. It has been shown that, in addition to the obvious
18It may be worth recalling that the normalization of the Banzhaf index (still common in the literature)
completely distorts the conclusions. By normalizing the Banzhaf index by dividing each component by the
sum of the components, the probabilistic interpretation is lost. In addition to that it makes the comparison
of the rules meaningless. It may be that a state’s probability of being decisive increases while its percentage
of the sum of probabilities decreases. The normalization forces a comparison in terms of a zero-sum game,
in the sense that comparing percentages it is impossible for all percentages to increase or to decrease.
16diﬀerence of meaning, these two concepts are independent in the sense that neither of
them can be derived from the other in general, and their ”interim” conditional variations
behave diﬀerently. While the unconditional and interims variants coincide for decisiveness
under certain conditions on the prior p (met in particular for the usual normative prob-
ability distribution p∗), this is not so for the corresponding evaluations of success. The
relationship between Banzhaf’s and Rae’s measures established by Dubey and Shapley,
whose very especial character has been shown, may partly explain but never justify the
overlooking of success in the literature. Even if one only cares about the normative point
of view provided by p∗, for with an aﬃne relation holds, it remains the question of which
is the most relevant notion.
Perhaps the fascination raised by the notion of ”power” has caused a distortion of focus
in the ﬁeld. It can be argued that decisiveness seems intuitively closer to the notion of
”power” than that of success, but this does not grant greater credit to recommendations
based on this interpretation. In other words, the relevant question is not what notion is
closer to the intuitive idea of ”power”, but what is a more adequate basis for normative
recommendations. And as a base for normative recommendations (e.g., in connection with
important issues, as that of the most adequate voting rule in a committee of representa-
tives) it seems more relevant the notion of success than that of decisiveness. If this is taken
seriously it seems necessary a revision of the recommendations that have been made so far
based on the notion of power as likelihood of being decisive. In this sense the application
to the EU Council is a ﬁr s ts t e pi nt h i sd i r e c t i o n .
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19Ωi+
i (W, p∗) Ωi−
i (W,p∗) Ωi(W, p∗)
Country WNi WCs WCv WNi WCs WCv WNi WCs WCv
Austria 0.046 0.125 0.255 0.975 0.922 0.806 0.510 0.524 0.530
Belgium 0.048 0.126 0.258 0.977 0.924 0.808 0.513 0.525 0.533
Cyprus 0.040 0.120 0.244 0.968 0.918 0.795 0.504 0.519 0.519
Czech 0.048 0.126 0.258 0.977 0.924 0.809 0.513 0.525 0.533
Denmark 0.043 0.123 0.251 0.972 0.921 0.801 0.507 0.522 0.526
Estonia 0.040 0.121 0.245 0.968 0.918 0.796 0.504 0.519 0.520
Finland 0.043 0.123 0.251 0.972 0.921 0.801 0.507 0.522 0.526
France 0.063 0.159 0.334 0.992 0.956 0.884 0.528 0.558 0.609
Germany 0.063 0.180 0.379 0.992 0.978 0.930 0.528 0.579 0.654
Greece 0.048 0.126 0.258 0.977 0.924 0.809 0.513 0.525 0.534
Hungary 0.048 0.126 0.258 0.977 0.924 0.808 0.513 0.525 0.533
Ireland 0.043 0.122 0.249 0.972 0.920 0.799 0.507 0.521 0.524
Italy 0.063 0.158 0.332 0.992 0.956 0.883 0.528 0.557 0.607
Latvia 0.040 0.121 0.246 0.968 0.919 0.797 0.504 0.520 0.522
Lithuania 0.043 0.122 0.248 0.972 0.920 0.799 0.507 0.521 0.524
Luxemburg 0.040 0.120 0.243 0.968 0.918 0.794 0.504 0.519 0.519
Malta 0.039 0.120 0.243 0.967 0.918 0.794 0.503 0.519 0.518
Netherlands 0.050 0.129 0.266 0.978 0.927 0.817 0.514 0.528 0.542
Poland 0.062 0.144 0.303 0.990 0.941 0.854 0.526 0.543 0.578
Portugal 0.048 0.126 0.258 0.977 0.924 0.808 0.513 0.525 0.533
Slovakia 0.043 0.123 0.251 0.972 0.921 0.802 0.507 0.522 0.526
Slovenia 0.040 0.121 0.246 0.968 0.919 0.796 0.504 0.520 0.521
Spain 0.062 0.144 0.304 0.990 0.942 0.854 0.526 0.543 0.579
Sweden 0.046 0.125 0.256 0.975 0.923 0.807 0.510 0.524 0.531
U.K. 0.063 0.159 0.335 0.992 0.957 0.886 0.528 0.558 0.610
Table 1: Probabilities of success in the EU-25 countries under the three rules.
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